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In 1935, at the depths of the Great Depression when prospects for
American workers and businesses seemed bleak, Congress sought to
improve both the lives of workers and the economy by enacting the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). While some pieces of New Deal
legislation, such as the Social Security Act and the Fair Labor Standards
Act, decreed specific rights for workers and obligations for employers to
address specific workplace problems, the vision reflected in the NLRA,
named after its principal sponsor Robert Wagner, was radically different.
Rather than dictating substantive rights and obligations, the Wagner Act
instead established a process under which firms and their employees
could define their own rights and obligations. Even more radically, the
process it created was not one in which workers, as individuals, could,
for the most part, assert their rights. Instead it was a process in which
workers would have to channel their efforts into a collective voice in
order to advance their interests. Workers could gain substantive rights
under the NLRA only by joining together in labor organizations and
using their collective economic power to persuade employers to grant
employees’ rights in collective bargaining agreements. Unions of workers
were granted rights that they could exercise collectively on behalf of
their members. Individual employees were granted some rights—the
rights to join unions and to engage in other concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection—but the individual rights were granted to facilitate
group activity. The government would police the process, but it would
not define the terms of employment. The entire regime of individual and
group rights is premised on assumptions about the social and economic
importance of collective action. The chapters in Labor Law Stories
consider the endurance of this collective model as the American workplace has evolved in the seventy years since enactment of the NLRA.
The text of the NLRA was brief. Congress created an administrative
agency, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and entrusted it
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further to define the meaning of the statute and to implement its
provisions. In the beginning, the agency was fragile. Statutes similar to
the NLRA had recently been held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. Some labor relations experts were so sure that the NLRA would
meet the same fate that would-be appointees were reluctant to assume
positions at the agency and many employers felt confident in ignoring its
directives.
Congress’ decision to entrust enforcement of the National Labor
Relations Act to an expert agency was animated by several concerns.
Some were the same concerns that inspired the creation during the New
Deal of expert administrative agencies in many areas of government, and
some were unique to the field of labor relations. Congress distrusted the
capacity and willingness of federal judges to resolve labor disputes
because the federal courts had, in the view of Progressive supporters of
labor legislation, completely disgraced themselves in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century by enjoining all manner of worker action. A
politically accountable agency staffed with labor lawyers seemed infinitely preferable to federal courts. In addition, the New Deal was the high
water mark of faith in the power of experts to resolve disputes in a way
that could transcend politics. The NLRB was supposed to be staffed with
expert labor economists, sociologists, and lawyers who would design a
legal regime that would be the best it could be. The notion that the legal
issues that emerged from the great contest of capital and labor could be
resolved by the application of expertise has in retrospect come to seem
hopelessly naive. Congress’ early faith in experts never enjoyed the
chance to be tested, as an early effort to purge the agency of suspected
communists led to the elimination of the labor economists and sociologists. Yet the argument for judicial deference to the agency’s expertise
has persisted over time, if only because the Board and its staff examine
thousands of labor disputes every year whereas any particular court sees
only a handful. That labor policy should be made by a politically
accountable agency remains a plausible justification for judicial deference to NLRB decisionmaking. But in labor law as elsewhere, courts find
it extremely difficult to defer to the political judgments of an agency with
which they strenuously disagree. In short, the dance between the agency
and the judiciary—a dance that is done throughout the modern administrative state—is particularly elaborate and has an especially interesting
and well-documented history in the field of labor relations, and its
development over time merits study by anyone interested in modern
American law and government.
Also underlying Congress’ decision to trust labor relations to an
expert agency was the Progressive-era conviction that an accurate understanding of the facts of a dispute was absolutely crucial to appropriate
application of law. In one respect, labor is no different than any other
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field in the importance of facts. The facts of the case are crucial to the
success of the litigants in many cases. Obviously that is true in the trial
court or administrative agency where the facts are found, established,
developed, or invented, depending on your point of view. Even in the
appellate courts, where facts are conventionally thought to take a back
seat to the law, facts matter. An eminent federal appellate judge once
confessed that the most important part of a brief, the part most likely to
persuade the court of appeals—after the names of the lawyers on the
cover—was the statement of facts. A well-written statement of facts, in
his view, could tell the court what the legal issues were and how they
should be decided. Yet facts are given short shrift in most law school
casebooks, and in most appellate opinions. Students learn to read facts in
order to engage in common law reasoning, to distinguish the instant case
from precedent, and they endure the recitation of old adages about facts
(‘‘hard cases make bad law’’ or ‘‘when the facts are in your favor, argue
the facts; when the law is in your favor, argue the law, and when neither
is in your favor, argue policy’’). But students are sometimes not told
much about how perceptions of facts shape the perceived need for legal
rules. Nowhere is the importance of facts greater than in the area of
labor law. Lawyers know, and young lawyers must learn, the importance
of developing a solid factual record. In one case discussed here, for
example, the most important ‘‘fact’’ to the Supreme Court may not have
been a fact at all. But it was an assertion of fact that became part of the
administrative record and that could not be challenged on appeal. Law
students are ill-served by training that teaches them to be blind to the
importance of facts in shaping perceptions of justice, and to the necessity
of and techniques for establishing a desirable factual record on which to
base their legal arguments.
The chapters in this book tell the story of the development of labor
law over the course of nearly seventy years, beginning with one of the
earliest of the Supreme Court’s cases under the NLRB and ending with
one of its most recent. The first story we present is that of Mackay
Radio, which arose in a context when the employer believed it could
avoid any liability for its actions by challenging the constitutionality of
the Act. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1938, only one year
after the constitutionality of the Act was established, and although the
employer’s constitutional challenge to the statute failed, the case found
the Court and the NLRB still very cautious about the power of Congress
to regulate the workplace. The case offered the Court an opportunity to
address one of the fundamental questions that the brief statutory
language had failed to answer. If the design of the Act called for
employees to gain rights through the use of economic force—going on
strike—was the employer free to give their jobs to others if they did so?
In dicta that eventually proved to be far more powerful than the case’s
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holding, the Court said that employers had the right permanently to
replace striking workers. To contemporary ears, the conclusion seems
profoundly at odds with the statute’s express protection of the right to
strike and reliance on economic power as exercised in a strike as the
catalyst that would produce collective bargaining agreements which
would be the source of employee rights. The chapter by Julius G.
Getman and Thomas C. Kohler on Mackay Radio explains the puzzle of
how such a basic principle of American labor law could appear to be
established so casually. It also explains why the ‘‘right’’ permanently to
replace striking workers was not exercised frequently enough for the
Court’s conclusion to seem controversial until decades after the case was
decided. The chapter also examines the devastating impact of the recent
widespread use of permanent replacements in a legal regime that rests
on the ability of workers to exercise economic power through strikes.
When the NLRA was first enacted, Congress is generally thought to
have assumed that the process of collective bargaining could be advanced
simply by protecting the right of employees to organize and by directing
employers to bargain once their employees had chosen a labor organization as their representative. Economic power demonstrated, if necessary,
through strikes and lockouts would determine the nature and results of
the collective bargaining process. In 1947, however, with the Republican
party in control of Congress and the post-war wave of strikes testing the
limits of legislative patience with laissez faire, Congress enacted the
Taft–Hartley Act which significantly modified the Wagner Act regime.
While limiting the right of employees to use all sorts of economic
weapons by adding union unfair labor practices to the statute for the
first time, Congress also recognized that it would be necessary to
establish legally-enforceable rules for bargaining to prevent union and
employer behaviors that could make a mockery of the process. Although
Congress in 1947 mandated that the parties bargain in good faith, again
it left the details to the NLRB. Would collective bargaining be a rational
process in which results arose from equal access to information and
reflected the parties’ mutual best interests? Or would it be an economic
power struggle in which the stronger party, whether employer or union,
would impose its will on the weaker? The chapter by Kenneth G. Dau–
Schmidt on Truitt Manufacturing Company (1956) and Insurance
Agents’ International Union (1960) describes the struggle between the
NLRB and the Supreme Court to define the duty to bargain in good
faith. The chapter examines, from the perspective of economic analysis,
the two cases, which seem paradoxically to expect collective bargaining
to be both a battle of economic power and a process of rational decisionmaking.
While Congress’ answer to workplace regulation in 1935 had been to
establish a collective bargaining process, it had surprisingly little to say
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about the enforcement of the agreements reached through collective
bargaining until it enacted the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947. In an effort to
make unions and firms accountable for the agreements that they
reached, Congress for the first time made unions subject to suit as
entities and provided that collective bargaining agreements would be
enforceable in federal court. Once again though, its language was extraordinarily modest. Section 301 of the Taft–Hartley Act simply gave
federal courts jurisdiction to hear actions for enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements without saying a word about the substantive law
that would govern such actions. Union lawyers who remembered the
hostility of federal courts to unions in the years before Congress eliminated federal court jurisdiction over labor disputes were skeptical about
the prospects of judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
Katherine V. W. Stone’s chapter on the Steelworkers Trilogy (1960) tells
how a determined group of union attorneys conceived a vision of collective bargaining agreement enforcement in which courts would direct
disputants to private arbitrators whose decisions would be final. The
chapter explains how these lawyers persuaded the Supreme Court to
accept that vision even if it required courts to refrain from overruling
arbitral awards with which they fundamentally disagreed. She also tells
though how the union lawyers’ success in keeping the courts out of the
arbitration process ironically led to greater judicial intrusion into union
internal affairs.
Although the central theme of the NLRA initially had been protection of workers’ right to organize, the brief and deliberately vague
language of the statute left many basic principles of the organizing
process to be defined by the NLRB and the courts even decades later. In
Gissel Packing (1969), the Supreme Court addressed two such issues.
First, did the First Amendment permit the NLRB to preclude employers
from making negative predictions about the effect of unionization on
their businesses? Second, was the agency permitted to conclude that in
some cases an employer’s misconduct during an organizing campaign so
intimidated workers that the agency could order the employer to bargain
with the union as the exclusive representative of its employees even
though the union never won a representation election? The chapter on
Gissel Packing by Laura J. Cooper and Dennis R. Nolan describes how
the Supreme Court accepted the agency’s paternalistic image of worker
vulnerability and answered both questions affirmatively but explains
why that case’s holdings seem to have had so limited an effect.
No story of American law or history, especially labor history, can be
told without acknowledging the powerful legacy of slavery and the
persistence of race discrimination. Not surprisingly, the law of labor
relations struggled with issues of race over the course of the twentieth
century. In the 1930’s, a group of talented black lawyers began a
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litigation campaign to challenge segregation in schools, places of public
transportation, and the workplace. One of the cases they brought, Steele
v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad, challenged the racial segregation
on Southern railroads maintained by the all-white railroad workers’
unions. During World War II, when blacks were conscripted to fight and
die along with whites, and when America professed to the world its
moral superiority to the Nazi regime, the black workers finally found a
sympathetic forum in the U.S. Supreme Court when the legal system
could no longer afford to ignore blatant race discrimination on the home
front. Deborah Malamud’s chapter on Steele v. Louisville and Nashville
Railroad Company (1944) describes how a careful litigation strategy led
the Court to find that when law permits a union to be the exclusive
representative of workers at a firm it also imposes upon the union an
implicit obligation to represent all workers fairly. More broadly, the
chapter informs the longstanding debate about the relationship between
litigation and social change.
As the civil rights movement gained strength and a particularly
forceful voice in the Black Power movement of the late 1960’s, the fight
over persistent racial inequality in employment continued. In Emporium
Capwell (1975), a group of black department store employees in San
Francisco were fired for picketing and demanding that the Emporium
cease discriminating. The rule that the union is the exclusive representative of the workers—the very principle that had given rise to rights of
black workers in Steele—now condemned the black department store
workers for seeking to talk to their employer outside the collective
bargaining process. Justice Thurgood Marshall, the first African–American to sit on the Supreme Court and a principal architect of the
litigation strategy that struck down racial segregation, wrote the Court’s
opinion denying these workers the right to protest. In this chapter,
Professors Marion Crain, Calvin William Sharpe and Reuel E. Schiller
explore the painful dilemma posed by the principles of exclusive representation and majority rule upon with the labor law system rests. They
offer diverse perspectives on whether the Supreme Court in Emporium
Capwell properly balanced individual and collective rights.
The NLRA’s vision that a process of collective bargaining, rather
than substantive rights, could best protect workers was again tested
later in the twentieth century when American businesses found new
ways to structure their operations in an effort to drive down labor costs.
The Supreme Court concluded in First National Maintenance (1981) that
the duty to bargain does not apply to the decision whether to eliminate
unionized jobs by closing a part of a company’s operations, at least in
some situations. Of what value is collective bargaining if fundamental
restructuring decisions that cost unionized workers their jobs can be
made in the absence of an obligation to bargain? In the chapter on First
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National Alan Hyde reveals the peculiar path that brought the case
before the Supreme Court and the courtyard negotiations between
Supreme Court law clerks that produced Justice Blackmun’s bewildering
answer to the question.
As American businesses faced the challenge of global economic
competition in the late 1980’s they looked abroad to Japan and elsewhere and saw models of employee involvement in workplace decisionmaking that they thought enabled their foreign competitors to outdistance American productivity. Business owners asserted that a littlenoticed provision of the NLRA, thought fundamental to prohibit employer-dominated ‘‘company unions’’ in the 1930’s, was outdated and now
prevented American firms from enjoying the benefits of worker participation. Unions feared a change in the law that had always prohibited
employer domination of employee participation programs would pave the
way for a resurgence of company unions to forestall employee demands
for an independent union and full collective bargaining. In the chapter
on Electromation (1992), Robert B. Moberly describes how employers
and their lawyers organized a challenge to this provision before the
NLRB and in Congress. Their argument that the NLRA’s 1935 adversarial model of employer-union relationships could not meet the challenges of the twentieth century failed to persuade either the Board or
Congress. The Act’s mandate that worker-employer negotiations had to
be channeled into a structure of collective bargaining and exclusive
representation endured in the face of this powerful assault.
Now, in the twenty-first century, the Act’s language and vision are
facing new questions as the structure and composition of the American
workforce changes. Virtually every piece of protective labor legislation
reflects major policy judgments about the scope of legal protection for
workers in its definition of which workers are covered by it. The NLRA
is no different. Particularly in the last two decades, as union organizing
has spread into sectors of the economy where union density historically
has been low—health care, white collar work, and low-wage workplaces
dominated by recent immigrants—there have been pitched legal battles
over which workers are to be protected. Two of the most controversial
areas have been the exclusion of nominally supervisory workers and
undocumented immigrant workers from the protections of the NLRA.
The final two chapters deal with these issues, addressing the particular
issue in each case in the context of the much broader legal and social
dispute about the need and prospects for unions in the evolving globalized American labor market and in unconventional managerial structures where even relatively low-level employees have some supervisory
responsibility.
As the lines between employee and supervisor blur, will the result be
that large proportions of the workforce become classified as supervisors
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with no protection from an Act that affords rights only to non-supervisory employees? Marley Weiss’ chapter on Kentucky River Community Care
(2001) addresses that question in the context of the growing health care
industry. Kentucky River is the second of two cases decided by the
Supreme Court within the space of relatively few years that addressed
the question whether nurses working in nursing homes are exempt from
labor law protections because they are ‘‘supervisors.’’ The chapter examines the role of union organizing in the health care industry and the
vexing question of how the exempt category of ‘‘supervisor’’ should be
defined in an era of increasingly flat hierarchies.
Another profound change in the twenty-first century workforce is
the growing number of foreign-born workers. Much union organizing
today is occurring in low-wage workplaces dominated by immigrant
workers, many of whom are undocumented. While the NLRB seeks to
protect the NLRA rights of all workers, both documented and undocumented, immigration laws seek to discourage illegal immigration by
prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers. Should the
objectives of the immigration laws preclude the NLRB from providing
remedies to a worker, denied work in violation of the NLRA, when doing
that work was unlawful under immigration statutes? Or would denying
remedies to undocumented aliens under the NLRA increase incentives to
employ undocumented workers by making them less risky to hire and
cheaper to fire? Catherine L. Fisk and Michael J. Wishie in their chapter
on Hoffman Plastic Compounds (2002) show how immigration law
enforcement won the battle with labor rights enforcement, leaving an
ever-expanding proportion of the workforce beyond the basic protections
of the law.
While the chapters describe the doctrinal evolution of law under the
NLRA in the seventy years since its enactment, the fundamental purpose of this book is to tell the stories of the cases in which these
doctrines emerged. The authors have interviewed dozens of participants
in these cases—representatives of unions and management, union organizers, lawyers for unions, companies and the NLRB, members of the
NLRB and Supreme Court law clerks. They have pored over archival
records of the NLRB and the papers of lawyers and Supreme Court
justices. They have read transcripts of agency hearings and Supreme
Court arguments. They bring to this volume quite remarkable stories of
how law gets made, how this process of law-making by litigation affects
the lives of the people involved and their advocates, and how the law
they make sometimes has an impact on others, and sometimes does not.
Readers familiar with labor law may be charmed by some of the
previously unknown anecdotes about these cases we discovered in our
research. A worker’s birth certificate dramatically thrown in the wastebasket in the midst of a hearing before an administrative law judge
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became the crucial evidence that led the case to the Supreme Court. An
NLRB lawyer falsely represented the agency’s law to the Supreme Court
because he thought it would help the case. A lawyer who won his case in
the Supreme Court later served time in prison for arson. A lawyer tried
to tell a judge what a Senator meant by language in the statute, only to
have the judge reply that he’d been the Senator’s staff member at the
time and knew exactly what the Senator meant.
There is more to knowing the story behind the leading labor law
cases than the delight of surprise. This book resolves some of the
mysteries that have puzzled generations of students and teachers. Few
people who know Justice Thurgood Marshall’s career as one of the
pioneering lawyers who established the modern civil rights regime can
read his opinion in Emporium Capwell, which paves the way to uphold
the firing of black civil rights protesters precisely because of their civil
rights protest, without wondering whether he felt any heartache about
his decision, or worried if he was doing the right thing. The chapters on
Steele and Emporium Capwell make clear that his views on the benefits
of unionization for black workers were strong and longstanding. Ever
since employers began in the 1980’s to invoke in earnest the right
established in Mackay Radio permanently to replace striking workers,
labor law students have wondered why such a major limitation on the
right to strike was so casually engrafted onto the statute by the Supreme
Court in 1938, and whether it was considered at the time to be nearly
the death blow to the labor relations regime that later critics believed it
to have been. Why did the employer in First National Maintenance
expend the funds necessary for Board, appellate court, and Supreme
Court review when it could have instead just bargained to impasse with
the union at seemingly little cost?
The benefit of knowing the full story behind these cases is greater
even than being charmed by stories or satisfied by the resolution of
mysteries. The law of work shapes the life story of real people. Work is
central to every aspect of our society. It is where we spend most of our
waking hours. It is how we support ourselves and our families. It is the
origin of much of society’s wealth. Personal identity is often defined in
significant part by our workplace role. We bring to the workplace our
basic values of freedom, democracy, autonomy, and fairness. The stories
we tell here are the stories of people from many walks of life—railroad
firemen, nurses, factory workers, insurance agents, janitors, retail clerks
and radio operators—who sought by collaborating with fellow workers to
control their destinies. Some, like William Steele, succeeded. Winning a
case worked a significant improvement in his life. Some failed, like the
anonymous undocumented worker whose unsuccessful union organizing
effort became Hoffman Plastic. These are also the stories of those whom
they challenged—employers in a variety of industries who sought recog-
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nition of their rights as owners of capital to manage their businesses in
the interests of owners and stockholders. For almost all of them, the case
was not about the arcana of legal doctrine, it was about how the law and
lawyers would treat their aspirations and fears.
The ten chapters here present the story of fourteen decisions of the
Supreme Court and one from the National Labor Relations Board that
never made it to the Supreme Court. The cases were identified as the
most important labor law decisions from a survey of professors who
regularly discuss these cases in their labor law courses. The stories
behind the cases show the great variety of ways in which landmark cases
become landmarks. By itself, that process can be intriguing. To law
students, it may help when wading through the darker moments of law
school to realize that one day, sooner than you might think, it might be
your case that makes it to the Supreme Court or that is reported in the
newspaper or on TV. Some of these cases were planned to be landmarks
from the very beginning. Steele, for example, was part of the decadeslong legal strategy developed and implemented by African–American
lawyers to challenge race discrimination in society. In this respect, the
story of Steele, like the story of Brown v. Board of Education, is a story
of the calculated use of law to effect radical social change. But other
cases in this volume wound up as landmarks by fortuity, by the lawyer
stumbling upon the right argument on the right facts in front of the
right judge at the right time. Sometimes a case achieves prominence
despite the parties’ desires to the contrary, as in the unsuccessful effort
of counsel on both sides to try to preclude oral argument before the
NLRB in Electromation. More often, though, as with most of the cases in
this book, routine cases that appear undifferentiated from the thousands
of cases decided by the NLRB each year, by happenstance get selected for
Supreme Court review, thrusting ordinary lawyers into the national legal
spotlight. In some cases, the spotlight proved irresistible. In Gissel a
management lawyer argued the case in the Supreme Court without
compensation from the client, not revealing to the Court that the case
was moot, because he so desired the experience. In First National
Maintenance, the company’s lawyer insisted on presenting the argument
himself although the U.S. Chamber of Commerce reportedly offered him
tens of thousands of dollars to let its lawyer present the argument
instead.
While the cases were selected because of professors’ perceptions that
they were the most important in the labor law cannon for their doctrinal
holdings, our deeper research into the actual effects of these cases
revealed the sometimes limited effect of Supreme Court decisionmaking
to affect change in the conduct of real parties in labor relations. The
Court’s decision in First National Maintenance articulated a rule for a
set of circumstances so unlikely that even that case did not really
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manifest them. Neither of Gissel’s holdings ended up truly governing
union elections because lower courts proved so resistant to its directives.
Truitt set the ground rules for employer disclosure of financial information so clearly that the case provided a script for avoiding disclosure,
wholly undermining what the decision sought to achieve.
To scholars, reading these chapters may shed light on the old
question of the extent to which law changes because society changes and
to what extent law changes because of debates internal to the law. All
agree that the relationship between legal change and social change is
extremely complex, and the last generation of legal scholarship has more
or less established that no single theory can explain all cases. These
stories confirm the multiple ways in which law and other social and
economic forces contribute to change. The chapter on Steele, for example, shows that the multi-faceted litigation and political strategy that,
eventually, dismantled the thorough-going racial segregation of so many
aspects of life, played a major role in changing the lives of black workers.
The reductionist position that litigation by itself dismantled Jim Crow is
proven false, as is the equally reductionist position that litigation did
nothing that would not have been achieved by social protest or lobbying.
The interesting story is the complex mix of deliberate choices and luck,
the differences that litigation made, and the significant limits on what
litigation achieved.
We hope that reading the stories behind these cases will deepen both
your understanding of and your affection for labor law. Labor law is
special because unlike nearly all other legal doctrines it prioritizes group
collective rights above individual rights. It gives us the opportunity
examine law-making in a real-world high-volume administrative agency
that struggles to maintain uniform national application of the law while
dependent for ultimate enforcement on appellate courts that sometimes,
despite Supreme Court insistence on deference, cannot resist effectuating their own notions of how the law should be interpreted and applied.
While other courses about the law of the workplace sometimes seem an
incoherent collection of independent doctrines, labor law offers a comprehensive and consistent vision of workplace organization and decisionmaking, whose success can be tested against a constantly changing
variety of issues.
The collective model that captured Congress’ vision of workplace
governance in 1935 also is the organizational principle for the authors of
this book. This book was written by the Labor Law Group, a non-profit
organization created from the 1946 observation of W. Willard Wirtz,
then a law professor at Northwestern University, that labor law professors, working collectively without individual compensation, could best
bring to the law school classroom labor law teaching materials that truly
reflected the real lives of employees and employers. The Labor Law
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Group, composed of approximately fifty professors in the U.S., Canada,
Europe and Israel, today have in print six books on labor and employment law. All royalties generated by Group publications are held in trust
for educational purposes and none inure to the benefit of any individual.
This book, like the statute that gave rise to its subject, is inspired by the
belief that people working together can achieve objectives that those
working alone cannot.

